Regional biotechnology regulations: Design options and implications for good governance by Birner, Regina & Linacre, Nicholas
 
 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 00753 
February 2008 
 
Regional Biotechnology Regulations 
Design Options and Implications for Good Governance 
 
Regina Birner, International Food Policy Research Institute 
and  
Nicholas Linacre, The University of Melbourne 
 
Development Strategy and Governance Division 
and 
Environment and Production Technology Division INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS 
IFPRI’s research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial 
contributors and partners. IFPRI gratefully acknowledges generous unrestricted funding from Australia, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 




IFPRI Discussion Paper 00753 
February 2008 
 
Regional Biotechnology Regulations 
Design Options and Implications for Good Governance 
 
Regina Birner, International Food Policy Research Institute 
and  
Nicholas Linacre, The University of Melbourne 
 
Development Strategy and Governance Division 
and 
Environment and Production Technology Division Published by 
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
2033 K Street, NW 






1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI 
were merged into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the 
prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s 
website at www.ifpri.org/pubs/otherpubs.htm#dp. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They have not been subject to formal 
external reviews managed by IFPRI’s Publications Review Committee but have been reviewed by at least one 
internal and/or external reviewer. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
 
Copyright 2008 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be reproduced for 
personal and not-for-profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the 
material contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the 





Abstract  vi 
1. Introduction  1 
2.  The Quest for Regional Biotechnology Regulation in West Africa  5 
3. Conceptual  Framework  11 
4.  Regional Biotechnology Regulation– Which Way is Forward?  36 
Appendix: Interviewee Affiliation  40 




List of Tables 
1.  Options for regional regulatory resign  12 
2.  Criteria for assessing regulatory design options  17 
3.  Types of risks and implications for regulatory design  22 
4.  Types of costs and benefits of different regulatory transactions  24 
5.  Attributes involved in different regulatory transactions  27 
6.  Implications of different ways to finance a regional regulatory system  34 
7.  Factors to be considered in decisions on regulatory design options  36 
List of Figures 
1.  Membership of West and Central African countries in different regional bodies  6 
2. Comparative  efficiency  of different governance structures: Level of governance  25 






This paper is based on a Stocktaking Assessment of Biosafety Regulation in West Africa, which was 
conducted for the World Bank. The authors wish to thank Papa Meissa Dieng, Gegory Jaffe, Hector 
Quemada and Danielle Resnick, who were members of the Stocktaking Assessment Team. The detailed 
comments by an anonymous reviewer are greatly appreciated. We also thank Jock Anderson for his 
valuable comments. A previous version of the paper was presented at the 11th International Conference 
on Agricultural Biotechnologies: “New Frontiers and Products – Economics, Policies and Science” 
organized by the International Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology Research in Ravello, Italy, July 
26-29, 2007. We are grateful for the comments received from conference participants. Special thanks are 
due to Sanibé Abel Kone for his support in the region, and to all persons in West Africa who were 
interviewed for this study. The funding for the empirical field work in this study, provided by the World 
Bank (Contract 7138926), is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are those of the 




Many developing countries are currently in the process of designing regulatory systems that should allow 
them to use genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for agricultural development, while also managing 
the food safety and environmental risks potentially associated with these technologies. Various regions of 
the developing world are seeking to establish regional systems of biotechnology regulation. However, 
considerable costs are associated with biotechnology regulation, and biosafety specialists are scarce. In 
addition, there is no consistent understanding of how regional systems of biotechnology regulation can be 
designed to be effective and efficient, while also fulfilling the principles of good governance, such as 
transparency, voice and accountability, control of corruption, and avoidance of special interest capture. 
There are a wide variety of possible regional approaches, differing with regard to the level of 
centralization, the scope of the regional system, the types of regional institutions and processes, and the 
types of financing mechanisms. Here, based on findings in the fields of environmental and fiscal 
federalism and transaction costs economics, we develop a conceptual framework for the assessment of 
regional systems of biotechnology regulation. The framework specifies design options and assessment 
criteria, and identifies major trade-offs and their mediating factors. We use the case of West Africa to 
illustrate this framework, and refer to the European Union for comparison. Our analysis indicates that 
involving regional experts, stakeholders and policy-makers in the design of a regional regulatory system 
will help fill knowledge gaps and generate conclusions regarding the trade-offs involved in regional 
biotechnology regulation. 
Keywords: regional biotechnology regulation; regulatory federalism; transaction cost economics; 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Genetically modified (GM) crops offer a considerable potential for contributing to agricultural 
development. While the perceptions regarding the risks associated with this technology differ widely, 
there is agreement that the introduction of GM crops requires regulation. In fact, regulation is the primary 
policy instrument that societies use to manage the risks associated with this technology. The institutional 
design and function of a regulatory system have far-reaching implications in terms of making this 
technology available to farmers, ensuring environmental and food safety, and creating incentives for 
innovation. Whether or not the public will develop or maintain trust in biotechnology also depends to a 
large extent on the design and functionality of the regulatory system. Therefore, biotechnology regulation 
is an important element of good governance in the agricultural sector.  
Agricultural biotechnology regulation seeks to manage the different types of potential risks 
associated with GM technology. The environmental risks include gene flow to non-cultivated plants, 
which may have negative effects for biodiversity. The agronomic risks can include resistance problems in 
the GM crops themselves, and (as a consequence of gene flow) in weeds related to the cultivated crops 
(Ellstrand, Prentice, & Hancock, 1999). Another issue that regulation can address is the potential of gene 
flow to the fields of farmers who prefer growing non-GM crops, and who may lose a price premium as a 
consequence (co-existence regulations). The food and feed safety regulations seek to prevent the inclusion 
of allergens and toxins in GM crop-derived food or feed. Another area of biotechnology regulation deals 
with the import and export of GM crops and their derived products. The labeling of food and feed derived 
from GM crops, as well as the socio-economic risks associated with the introduction of GM crops, can all 
be subject to regulation.  
Considerable disagreement exists within and across countries regarding the importance of these 
risks and the scientific possibilities for adequately assessing them. There is also disagreement regarding 
the need for labeling and regulation of socio-economic risks. This disagreement has led to the 
development of a wide range of regulatory systems around the world, varying from stringent to 
permissive. The regulatory system of the EU is widely considered to be on the stringent end of this 
spectrum, while that of the US is on the permissive end (Paarlberg, 2001; Bernauer, 2003). Obviously, 
regulatory decision-making is only partly determined by the institutional features of a given regulatory 
system. The global “regulatory divide” in biotechnology regulation is also due to differences in political 
and economic factors, as well as in societal values (Bernauer, (2003). Contrasting regulatory philosophies 
play a role, too, as pointed out by Arcuri (2000). In this respect, a “technocratic” philosophy, which 
assumes that the risks involved in biotechnology can be fully understood by science and managed in a 




knowledge can inform, but not replace, policy-maker and societal debates regarding public decisions on 
biotechnology (Bromley, 2006). 
Against the background of this global regulatory divide, many developing countries are currently 
in the process of developing regulatory systems for biotechnology. More than 120 countries party to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety are currently participating in the “Development of National Biosafety 
Frameworks” project of the United Nations Environment Program and the Global Environmental Facility 
(UNEP-GEF). Eight countries have moved to the next stage, namely the UNEP-GEF project on the 
“Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks”.
1 Concerns about the costs associated with 
biotechnology regulation, and potential problems with controlling trans-boundary movements of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) across neighboring countries have sparked a strong interest in 
regional collaborations for biotechnology regulation throughout the developing world (GEF, 2006).  
Despite this increasing interest in regional regulation worldwide, however, there is almost no 
literature examining which type of regional coordination for biotechnology regulation would be preferred, 
based on the context- and region-specific conditions. Regional coordination can obviously take different 
forms, ranging from informal collaborations, mutual recognition systems and voluntary guidelines on the 
harmonization of regulatory standards, all the way to the establishment of a regional regulatory system 
overseen by a central regulatory authority. Countries that are interested in regional regulation need to 
answer a range of questions regarding the governance structure of that system. Which degree of 
centralization should they aim for? How should the institutions for regional biotechnology regulation be 
structured? How independent from political decision-making bodies should they be? Which forms of 
public participation should they entail? How should the regional regulatory system be financed? To 
design a regional regulatory system, the countries need to assess which factors influence the answers to 
these questions. 
The goal of this paper is to help bridge the knowledge gap on regional biotechnology regulation 
by developing a conceptual framework that identifies key factors for consideration when designing a 
regional system. This framework is mainly based on two branches of literature: the theory of 
environmental and fiscal federalism (Oates, 2001; Oates, 2004), and the New Institutional Economics 
literature, especially the transaction cost approach developed by Williamson (1991). The paper also takes 
the classical institutional economics literature into account (Bromley, 2006).  
The region of West Africa is taken as an example to illustrate this framework. West Africa is an 
interesting case, as several initiatives are currently underway in this region to establish a regional system 
for biotechnology regulation. The countries that are members of West Africa’s Permanent Inter-State 
Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) have developed a Framework Convention 
                                                      




for a Common Biosafety Regulation. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 
been collaborating with CILSS and with the West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research 
and Development (CORAF) to establish a regional system of biotechnology regulation in the wider 
ECOWAS region. The francophone countries that form the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) also plan to establish a common regional system for biotechnology regulation. These 
examples allow us to illustrate the design options, potentials and challenges of regional biotechnology 
regulation.  
Empirical data on biotechnology regulation in West Africa were collected by a multidisciplinary 
team in Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, Togo and Senegal, between May and August of 2006. Approximately 
130 semi-structured interviews were held with stakeholders from ministries, research institutes, producer 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.
2 In-country document 
collection and additional secondary research were used to substantiate the interviews. For the purpose of 
comparison and illustration, the paper also refers to the regional system of biotechnology regulation in the 
European Union (EU), using secondary sources on biotechnology regulation in the EU. 
By developing a conceptual framework based on economic theory, the paper seeks to improve 
decision-making during the design of regional regulatory systems. The framework does not provide a 
blueprint for a regional system for biotechnology risk regulation in West Africa or elsewhere. Likewise, 
the regulatory system in the EU is used only to illustrate the discussion, not as a “model” for other 
countries to follow. The EU system was chosen because it is de facto the only fully integrated regional 
system implemented worldwide.
3 As indicated above, this system is located on the stringent end of the 
regulatory spectrum, and is therefore not representative of the existing regulatory systems. Rather than 
providing blueprints or models, we herein attempt to identify issues and options relevant to the design of 
a regional regulatory system.  
Our goal is to identify the factors and trade-offs that political decision-makers may wish to 
consider during the design process. The development of a regulatory system, at both the national and 
regional levels, necessarily involves societal value judgments, for example, about the level of acceptable 
risk (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981). Hence, it is important that countries and 
regional communities make their own decisions, in line with the preferences of their societies, on the way 
in which they wish to regulate biotechnology. International agreements such as the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, regional treaties, and emerging international standards for biotechnology regulation provide 
important conditions for framing such decisions. Together with other disciplines, economic theory can 
provide insights for making decisions on regional regulatory design within these conditions. However, 
                                                      
2 A list of the organizations visited for this study is presented in the Annex. 




research can only inform, not replace, the deliberations of policy-makers and society regarding what they 
consider to be legitimate and justifiable reasons for various public policy decisions (Bromley, 2006). 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes major initiatives for regional 
biotechnology regulation in West Africa and outlines the system in place in the European Union for the 
purpose of comparison. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework and Section 4 derives conclusions 




2.  THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION IN 
WEST AFRICA 
Background 
The initiatives to establish regional systems for biotechnology regulation in West Africa are largely 
motivated by hopes that Bt cotton (insect-resistant cotton, which is genetically engineered using the soil 
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis) may be able to increase the competitiveness of cotton production in the 
region. West Africa is one of the major cotton producing regions in the world. In Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Côte D’Ivoire, which account for 80% of cotton production in West Africa (USDA, 2006), 
cotton is a major revenue source for a large part of the rural population, and a major source of export 
earnings. In Burkina Faso, cotton exports account for more than half of all export earnings, while those in 
Benin and Mali account for about one third and one quarter of export earnings, respectively (USDA, 
2006). In the face of strong international competition, a long-term decline in world market prices, and 
various agronomic challenges, agricultural research institutions and policy-makers have developed an 
interest in introducing GM cotton. In collaboration with Monsanto, Burkina Faso started field testing Bt 
cotton in 2003. Mali has contacted Monsanto and Syngenta to express interest in starting field trials, and 
the Côte d’Ivoire Agricultural Research Institute has suggested that once Côte d’Ivoire restores peace, it 
could become a regional leader in biotechnology research (USDA, 2006).  
Among the West African countries, to date only Burkina Faso has passed a biosafety law and 
established a regulatory system capable of processing applications for field trials and commercial 
releases. Most of the other countries have completed a Biosafety Framework with the assistance of 
UNEP-GEF, and they are in the process of developing biosafety laws (Jaffe & Meissa Dieng, 2007). The 
introduction of biotechnology has been politically contested throughout the region; these debates have 
delayed the passage of biosafety legislation in various countries, especially those having strong civil 
societies, such as Mali and Senegal (Birner, Resnick, & Linacre, 2007). As of 2002, Benin had declared a 
five-year moratorium on GMO use (Jaffe et al., 2007).
4  
As indicated above, three efforts are currently underway to establish regional systems of 
biotechnology regulation in West Africa, led by CILSS, WAEMU and ECOWAS in collaboration with 
CORAF. Figure 1 shows the countries that are currently members of these regional bodies. A number of 
factors provide a rationale for this interest in regional approaches to biotechnology regulation, as follows: 
(1) Most of the major cotton-producing countries in West Africa are relatively small in terms of 
population size, and they are among the poorest countries in the world. Hence, there is an expectation, 
especially among donor organizations, that these countries should exploit economies of scale in a regional 
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approach to biotechnology regulation. (2) Major agro-ecological zones cut across West Africa, 
contributing to economies of scale at the levels of risk assessment and risk management. This is 
especially the case for the cotton cultivation area, which covers a wide band of dry land located in central 
West Africa at the southern border of the Sahara. (3) A regional approach would facilitate the cross-
boundary movement of GM crops. This is important for West Africa’s landlocked countries, and for the 
efforts of WAEMU and ECOWAS to establish a common market in West Africa. (4) All countries in the 
region have used the African Model Law as a basis for developing their biosafety frameworks and draft 
legislation, meaning that there are no major between-country differences regarding the type of envisioned 
regulatory systems. 
Figure 1. Membership of West and Central African countries in different regional bodies  
 
Source: Resnick (2006) 
CILSS Framework Convention on Biosafety
5 
Among the three regional biosafety initiatives, the CILSS initiative is currently the most advanced. 
CILSS was established in 1973 in response to the drought and famine conditions afflicting the region at 
that time. The Framework Convention Introducing a Common Biosafety Regulation for the Prevention of 
Biotechnological Risks in the CILSS Countries was developed over the course of two years and adopted 
by the CILSS Council of Ministers in 2006. The CILSS countries still have to translate the convention 
                                                      




into national law; this is not expected to be completed before 2008. The convention seeks to harmonize 
national biosafety regulation in the member states by specifying the procedures, definitions, and 
responsibilities for the national authorities that will be set up by the member states. Under the convention, 
authorization is required for any activity involving GMOs, including their use in contained laboratories, 
confined field trials, and commercial releases, as well as for import and export. The convention addresses 
GMOs as well as products derived from GMOs, but the regulations apply only to derived products that 
are used as food or feed. Under the convention, a Regional Consultative Committee will be established to 
provide general technical and policy support to the national authorities. This committee, which will 
comprise representatives of the member states, will include individuals from the national biosafety 
agencies, as well as scientific experts and non-voting representatives of WAEMU and other relevant 
regional bodies. The committee will be able to make authorization decisions for countries that have not 
yet set up their regulatory systems, and decide when products will be marketed throughout the region. 
Otherwise, the authorization decisions will remain the responsibility of the member states. 
The CILSS Biosafety Convention has some similarities with the CILSS Common Regulation for 
the Registration of Pesticides. The latter body, created in 1999, established a regional process for the 
registration of pesticides. Under this convention, a company seeking to market a pesticide in any of the 
nine CILSS member countries must submit a single application to a committee of experts, who then 
assess the risks and make a decision for all nine countries. 
Regional Biosafety Initiatives by ECOWAS and CORAF
6 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) encompasses the 15 countries that 
comprise the entire West African region (Figure 1). The organization, which was founded in 1975, has 
four major objectives: to expand intra-community trade, improve physical infrastructure, reduce excessive 
external dependence, and create a single ECOWAS currency. The institutional structure of ECOWAS 
includes a secretariat, the Council of Ministers, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, and a 
parliament. Direct election of parliament members is planned by has not yet been implemented. Decisions 
made by ECOWAS need to be translated into national law to become effective. 
An important step for regional cooperation with regard to biosafety regulation at the ECOWAS 
level was the organization of a West Africa conference, which was held in Ouagadougou in June 2004. At 
this conference, the delegates decided to create: (1) a public information system on biotechnology for the 
region; (2) a partnership between West African and North American research institutes; and (3) a West 
African Biotechnology Center. At a conference held in Abuja in November 2004, attended by the West 
African Ministers of Science and Technology, it was decided that ECOWAS would take ownership of all 
                                                      




biotechnological initiatives in the region. Based on discussions from the abovementioned regional 
convention, CILSS was designated as the coordinator for the implementation of the region’s biosafety 
activities. Since CORAF is considered to be a technical arm of ECOWAS, CORAF’s Biotechnology and 
Bio-safety Program was adopted at the Abuja meeting as the ECOWAS agenda for agricultural research 
and development activities concerning biotechnology and biosafety.  
CORAF is a network of the National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) of 21 countries 
within the West and Central African regions. One of the main objectives of CORAF’s Biotechnology and 
Biosafety Program has been to demonstrate the potentials of biotechnology and influence political debates 
in favor of biotechnology. Another goal has been to augment the capacity of scientists to use 
biotechnology for agriculture.  With regards to the biosafety component the program, the main objectives 
include creating commonalities in biosafety procedures, strengthening institutional and human capacities 
in biosafety implementation, establishing a regional regulatory framework, and sensitizing the public. 
Donor funding, especially that from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
has played an important role in supporting the CILSS, CORAF and ECOWAS initiatives.  
The WAEMU Initiative to Establish a Regional Regulatory System 
The West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU), which includes eight francophone West 
African countries (see Figure 1), emerged in 1994 through a revision of the treaty of the Communauté 
Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest that was launched in 1973. The institutional structure of WAEMU 
comprises a Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Conference of Heads of States, and an 
Interparliamentary Committee. WAEMU’s Council of Ministers, unlike the corresponding body within 
ECOWAS, has decision-making authority; WAEMU can pass legislation that becomes immediately 
effective in the member states without having to be translated into national law. WAEMU’s trade 
liberalization scheme became effective in January 2000, resulting in the abolition of all tariffs on goods 
produced within the member states, the adoption of a common external tariff, and the standardization of 
business laws.  
WAEMU is currently in the process of establishing a regional regulatory system for 
biotechnology. WAEMU expects funding and technical support for establishing this system will come 
from the proposed GEF West Africa Regional Biosafety Project, which will be co-funded by the World 
Bank and the International Development Association (IDA). The project aims to: (1) produce operational, 
regionally-harmonized methodologies for risk assessment and management of Living Modified 
Organisms (LMOs) and LMO products, including a regional manual of procedures; (2) strengthen 
national biosafety frameworks to enable their implementation; and (3) set up a regional legal framework 




establish a regional observatory to monitor possible environmental and health impacts and socioeconomic 
issues.
7 The design of this regional regulatory system is still under discussion.  
The initiative to establish a regional regulatory system with support from the World Bank has 
been criticized by African and international civil society organizations that oppose the introduction of Bt 
cotton in the region. In a news release from 2006, members of these groups expressed concern that the 
project would “promote favorable regulations in a few key countries” and then “use these regulations as a 
model that can be imposed on neighboring countries by regional bodies” while side-stepping democratic 
debates (African Center for Biosafety, ETC Group, GRAIN, & RALLT, 2006).
8  
A Snapshot of the Regulatory Procedure for Biotechnology in the EU 
For the purpose of comparison, the regional regulatory system for biotechnology in the European Union 
is briefly sketched here.
9 Prior to 2003, the competent authority in the EU member state where the 
product was to be released was responsible for assessing its safety and notifying other member states of 
its approval, thus opening the way for marketing throughout the EU. EU-level intervention took place, 
however, if one member state disagreed with another’s decision. In 2003, Regulation 1829/2003 EC 
established a “one-door-one-key” approach to biotechnology regulation. This approach comprises four 
steps (Christoforou, 2004; Wendler, 2005): 
1)  A company submits an application to a national authority, which passes the application along to 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). EFSA is responsible for assessing the use of GMOs 
for food and feed, and the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment, which is necessary 
for GM crop production (prior iterations required two separate approval processes).
10  
2)  EFSA informs all EU member states and the public, and establishes an Opinion within six 
months. EFSA may ask a national food safety authority to carry out a food safety or 
environmental risk assessment, and requires a method validation from the Community Reference 
Laboratory to verify that the methods and samples fulfill the requirements of EU guidelines.  
3)  When completed, the EFSA Opinion is forwarded to the EU Commission, the member state and 
the applicant. Members of the public have the right to comment on the Opinion within 30 days. 
                                                      
7 See http://go.worldbank.org/MARGRHEKU0. This is a proposed four-year project, estimated to cost US$24.3 million, 
including US$5.4 million in GEF funding and US$5.3 million in IDA funding.  
8 While the introduction of Bt cotton is generally contested in the region, the WAEMU initiative has attracted particular 
attention from international environmental NGOs, because it is one of the first projects in the area of agricultural biotechnology 
that the World Bank decided to undertake after having refrained from a high-profile engagement in this area for many years. 
9 See http://www.gmo-compass.org/ for an overview. 
10 The delegation of environmental risk assessment to EFSA was not without criticism. Denmark, for example, questioned 
whether EFSA would have sufficient competence to address the various natural and environmental differences in the EU regions 




The Commission may consult with the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies in developing a draft decision.  
4)  The Commission’s draft decision is submitted to the Standing Committee on Food Chain and 
Animal Health, in which the member states are represented. A decision is made there according 
to a regulatory committee procedure known as “comitology.”
11 If the measures envisaged by the 
Commission are not in accordance with the committee's opinion, the Commission must refer 
them to the Council. The European Parliament must be informed about decisions to authorize the 
release of GMOs.
12 The EU Council has the ultimate authority to approve GM products, but the 
Council gets involved only if there is disagreement within the committee. The Council can decide 
with a qualified majority.
13 If an authorization is granted, it is valid in the EU for ten years an can 
be renewed after this time. If the EU Council does not reach a qualified majority, the decision is 
referred back to the Commission, which can then adopt its draft resolution.
14   
The Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health appears to be the major forum for 
negotiations with national administrations and stakeholders (Wendler, 2005). EFSA is also engaging with 
stakeholders. Its management board represents bodies across the agro-food chain, including consumer 
organizations, and its advisory forum includes representatives of the expert advisory or regulatory bodies 
of member states. The Commission engages with stakeholders through the Advisory Group on Food 
Chain and Animal Health. While authorization of GM products has been delegated to the EU level, the 
EU has left the specification of the regulations concerning the co-existence between GM and non-GM 
crops, including liability, to the member states, based on the assumption that cost-efficient solutions may 
differ between countries (Fischler, 2003). Labeling requirements for GM food, however, have been 
established at the regional level. 
                                                      
11 See http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/comitology_en.htm. 
12 The parliament does not vote on the authorization decisions. 
13 In the EU Council, votes are assigned to member states according to population size. For a qualified majority, 255 votes 
out of a total of 345 are required. Moreover, a member state may request verification that the QM represents at least 62% of the 
total population of the European Union. See http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/qualified_majority_en.htm.  
14 Virtually none of the applications processed since the end of the de facto moratorium in 2004 reached a qualified majority 
in the Council due to systematic voting abstention by certain countries, meaning that the applications have been sent back to the 
Commission. The abstention partly reflects internal disagreements within member states. For example, the coalition government 
that ruled Germany between 1998 and 2005, consisting of the Social Democrat and the Green Party, abstained from Council 




3.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
This section presents a conceptual framework that uses different theories of regulation to examine the 
design of a regional regulatory system. The section starts with an overview of the institutional design 
options currently available to policy-makers in West Africa and other regions looking to establish a 
regional regulatory system. The second sub-section discusses a set of criteria that policy-makers may 
wish to consider when comparing different regional regulatory system options. The third subsection 
reviews different branches of economic theory to identify factors and trade-offs that influence the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different regulatory design options. 
Options for Regional Regulatory Design 
Table 1 provides an overview of the institutional design options.   
1) Scope of the regional system: Obviously, it is important to determine the scope that a regional 
system should have, both in terms of substantive areas that may be regulated at the regional level, and in 
terms of the regulatory activities associated with each of these areas. As seen in the EU, a region may 
decide to regulate approvals for field testing, commercial release, and labeling
15 at the regional level, 
while leaving regulatory decisions on co-existence regulations and liability at the national level. Likewise, 
regions may decide to delegate some regulatory activities (e.g. risk assessment) to the regional level, 
while performing others (e.g. post-approval monitoring) at the national level. Apart from the EU, 
Australia’s federal system provides another example in which regulatory authority is assigned to different 
levels. The Australian Gene Technology Regulator controls centralized safety decisions, while the 
individual states act as autonomous units regarding the implementation of decisions (in this case for trade 
reasons). This strategy allows states to implement and maintain moratoria on the release of GMOs.
16  
2) Institutional structure of a regional system: A second design feature of a regional regulatory 
system is the institutional structure to be established. If a regulatory system is established within the 
framework of an existing regional organization, such as in the case of WAEMU, ECOWAS and the EU, 
the institutional structure of the regional organization provides important frame conditions for the 
institutional design of the regional regulatory system. Regulatory institutions that may be set up at the 
regional level include regional regulatory agencies, regional regulatory committees, and regional advisory 
councils. In case of CILSS, a regional regulatory committee was established. In the case of the EU, EFSA 
                                                      
15 As indicated in the introduction, the need for labeling is debated. There is no international consensus, rule or guideline on 
the use of mandatory labeling for GM food, so a regional system may or may not include labeling requirements. If one or more 
member states of a regional system have already established mandatory labeling, decisions on the regional system need to deal 
with this question. In the case of WAEMU, most member states have foreseen labeling in their draft biosafety laws (Jaffe and 
Meissa Dieng, 2007).  
16 Currently GM canola may not be planted in Tasmania and Western Australia. It may now be planted in Victoria and is 




was created in part because of the need to implement the EU regulation on GMOs. However, EFSA is 
also responsible for other types of environmental and food safety regulations. To some extent, the 
regulatory process in the EU also used pre-existing institutions, such as the Standing Committee on Food 
Chain and Animal Health. System designers should also decide whether regulation should rely on 
national scientific capacities, as in the case of the CILSS common pesticide regulation, or whether 
regional scientific organizations should be established. The EU relies on a combination of both.  
3) Decision-making at the regional level: With regard to regulatory decision-making, it is 
necessary to determine how much autonomy the decision-making body will have from the public 
administration. This question also arises at the national level. Australia, for example, uses an independent 
regulator who is accountable to the parliament. In the EU, by contrast, regulatory decisions are made by 
the public administration of the EU (the Commission), or in case of disagreement by a political body (the 
Council of Ministers).  
Table 1. Options for regional regulatory resign 
Decision points   Options  
1) Scope of the regional system 
Substantive areas that can be 
regulated at regional level 
¾  Approvals for  
a)  field trial applications and contained use 
b)  commercial releases 
c)  food and feed use 
¾  Liability and co-existence regulations 
¾  Labeling options 
¾  Intellectual property rights 
Types of regulatory activities that 
can be performed at the regional 
level 
¾  Standard-setting for and review of national pre- and post-approval 
activities 
¾  Pre-approval risk assessments  
¾  Approval decisions (see above) 
¾  Post-approval monitoring, compliance and enforcement activities 
¾  Enforcement of transboundary transport regulations 
2) Institutional structure of the regional system 
Type of institutions to be 
established 
¾  Regional authority with our without abolishment of national authorities 
¾  Regional advisory bodies, committees 
¾  Use of existing institutions or creation of specific institutions 
¾  Level of independence/autonomy  
Scientific capacity  ¾  Regional scientific institutions established or denominated versus 




Table 1. Continued 
Decision points   Options  
3) Decision-making at the regional level 
Mode of decision-making  ¾  Political or administrative decision-making 
¾  Binding without ratification at country level (i.e. self-executing) vs. 
binding after ratification vs. advisory 
¾  Consensus versus majority rules  
Degree and form of public 
participation in decision-making 
at different levels 
¾  Compulsory versus voluntary 
¾  Advisory councils, written comments, stakeholder meetings, public 
hearings, surveys 
Issues considered in decision-
making  
¾  Environmental and health risks; level of precaution 
¾  Socio-economic considerations 
¾  Ethical issues 
4) Financing of the regional system  
Mode of financing the system  ¾  Revenues from regional organization or member states  
¾  Application and license fees 
¾  Market levies 
¾  Donor funding 
5) Distribution of responsibilities between regulatory agency and industry 
Distribution of responsibilities  ¾  Different degree of responsibility of the industry for risk assessment 
and management 
6) Enforcement of the regional system 
Institutions and procedures used 
for enforcing regional decisions at 
the country level   
¾  Use of existing legal mechanisms (e.g. regional courts) 
¾  Creation of specific institutions for enforcement 
¾  Types of sanctions to be used 
7) Transition to regional system 
Mode of dealing with existing 
national regulations 
¾  “Grandfathering rules” 
¾  Discontinuation of existing rules 
Source: Adapted from (Birner & Linacre, 2007) 
There is also a need to decide on the decision mode of the regional body. Decisions could be 
binding on the member states without their ratification, as in the case of the EU authorization for GMO 
products. Alternatively, decisions may require ratification at the national level, or they may have only 
advisory character. Making decisions binding without ratification at the country level may be more 
feasible in regional organizations that can make binding decisions in other areas. This is the case for 
WAEMU, but not for ECOWAS. Alternatively, even in the absence of regional organization that has the 
authority to make binding decisions for member states, the states can still decide to abide by the decisions 
of a regional committee, as in the case of CILSS pesticide regulation. In this example, the system 
facilitates access to pesticides and reduces regulatory costs, apparently providing sufficient incentives for 
the states to abide by its recommendations.  
A design feature that has potentially far-reaching implications on the speed of regulatory 
decision-making is the nature of the rules that will be applied to this process. WAEMU requires decision-




different decision-making rules for the case of biotechnology regulation. In ECOWAS, decisions are 
made either by consensus or with a two-thirds majority, depending on the subject. In the EU, the Council 
can make regulatory decisions with a qualified majority, as indicated above.  
One issue that has proven rather controversial at the international level is the determination of 
factors that should be considered during regulatory decision-making. While it is generally agreed that 
environmental and health risks should be considered, there is some debate regarding the extent to which 
socio-economic considerations and ethical concerns should be addressed during the regulatory process. 
Since the debate in West Africa focuses on the Cartagena Protocol and Bt cotton (which is not a food 
crop), most of the attention to date has focused on addressing environmental risks within the decision-
making process. One of the most debated issues in regulatory decision-making on biotechnology is the 
use of the precautionary principle.
17 Even in the EU, which adopted the principle for biotechnology 
regulation, the interpretation of the precautionary principle in the regulatory process for biotechnology 
has remained debated (Levidow et al., 2007). Since the Cartagena Protocol and the African Model Law 
on Biosafety embrace the precautionary principle, it is an important issue in the debate on regional 
biotechnology regulation in West Africa. 
Another aspect of regulatory decision-making is the role of public participation, which may take 
different forms. The public can be granted the right to be informed and to submit opinions at various 
stages of the regulatory process. An early example of this approach is the US Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946, which requires that federal regulatory agencies provide for public participation by inviting 
written comments. Stakeholders may also be involved in a more institutionalized form, such as in 
advisory bodies. The EU uses both approaches. In contrast, the CILSS Pesticide Convention has no 
provisions for public participation (Jaffe et al., 2007). Participation has, however, been prominent in the 
UNEP-GEF-assisted development of biosafety frameworks in West Africa; in this context, public 
involvement has mostly taken the form of stakeholder participation in workshops (Resnick, 2006). The 
national biosafety draft laws in the WAEMU countries differ with regard to the type and degree of public 
participation that will be provided for in regulatory decision-making. Some countries plan to set up 
consultative committees that represent the public or stakeholders as part of their regulatory systems 
(Birner et al., 2007). 
4) Financing of the regional system: The way in which the regional regulatory system should be 
financed is another important design question. A number of different mechanisms for financing regulatory 
systems exist, and these may be used alone or in combination. They include market levies, license and 
                                                      
17 The “precautionary principle” justifies actions to avoid potential harm to health or the environment, despite lack of 





applications fees, tax revenues from the respective regional organizations, direct contributions from 
member states (according to some formula), and donor funding.  
5) Distribution of responsibilities between the regulatory agency and industry: The division of 
responsibilities in risk management/assessment between the regulatory agency and the biotechnology 
industry is another question of institutional design. In most existing regulatory system for biotechnology, 
risk assessment studies are conducted by the industry and are then reviewed by the regulatory agency. It is 
further necessary to decide how much (or how little) post-approval monitoring will be handled by the 
industry. 
6) Enforcement of the regional system: A functional regional system, unless completely 
voluntary, will also need a system of enforcement to ensure that member countries comply with 
centralized decisions. The case of the EU illustrates this point. In May 2004, the EU resumed GMO 
approvals, thus ending its de facto general moratorium. However, five EU member states maintained 
approval bans under their national safeguard measures. The EU Commission had strong incentives to 
induce these member states to lift their bans, as this had been required by the ruling of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on the biotechnology dispute.
18 The EU Council rejected a Commission-submitted 
proposal requiring that member states lift their bans, leaving the Commission with the option to bring an 
infringement action before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, in view of the politically 
charged atmosphere surrounding GMOs in the EU, it was considered to be highly inappropriate for the 
Commission to initiate litigation at the ECJ (Arcuri, 2007). The question of enforcement is also relevant 
for the West African case, as countries in the region have typically differed in their approaches for dealing 
with GMOs. At present, their strategies range from the approval of field trials in Burkina Faso to a 
moratorium in Benin. 
7) Transition to a regional system: Rules must be established for the transition to a regional 
system. In particular, it should be decided whether to uphold authorizations for field trials or commercial 
releases that had been established in a member state prior to its entry into the regional system. This 
question is relevant for the case of WEAMU, since Burkina Faso has already authorized field trials. 
Criteria for Assessing Regulatory Design Options 
The literature on environmental policy instruments provides important criteria that can be used to 
compare the various regulatory design options. Effectiveness in achieving the desired level of 
environmental and health safety is crucial, since this is the primary goal of biotechnology regulation. 
Hence, other criteria only become valid if this criterion is met. The effectiveness criterion is related to the 
                                                      
18 In 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina used the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to challenge the 
European Union’s (EU’s) de facto moratorium on biotechnology product approvals, which had been in place since 1998 




“Public Interest Theory” of regulation (Viscusi, Harrington, & Vernon, 2007), which assumes that the 
primary goal of regulation is to correct market failures and address externalities.  
Economic theory adds a range of economic criteria. If one considers that the benefits of 
regulation are difficult to quantify, cost-effectiveness becomes a useful criterion, assessing whether the 
regulatory system achieves the desired levels of environmental and food safety at the lowest possible 
costs. In contrast, if the benefits can be measured, cost-benefit analyses can be used to consider the 
“optimal intensity” of regulatory activity as a criterion. This intensity would be reached at the point where 
the marginal costs of regulation equal the marginal benefits. Another economic criterion highlighted in 
the environmental policy literature is dynamic efficiency, which is related to the effects of the regulatory 
system on the long-term effects, such as the creation of incentives for innovation. 
Next to effectiveness and economic criteria, there is a range of “good governance” criteria that 
can be derived from the literature on good governance. While this concept has remained subject to debate, 
the dimensions of good governance developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) have become 
widely accepted; these include voice and accountability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, rule of law, and political stability. Except for the last criterion, which applies to the 
country level as a whole, all of the other criteria can be applied to biotechnology regulation (see below). 
The government effectiveness criterion is linked to the abovementioned effectiveness and 
economic criteria, and is thus not listed separately in Table 2. An important aspect of regulatory quality is 
the minimization of special interest capture in regulation. This problem was highlighted in a seminal 
paper by Stigler (1971), which laid the foundation for the “capture theory of regulation.” The main 
argument of this theory is that firms have a strong interest in extracting rents from regulation, especially 
since regulation can restrict the entry of new firms, while voters do not have sufficient political incentives 
to prevent this type of rent-seeking. In the literature on agricultural biotechnology regulation, the question 
of capture is contested. Graff and Zilberman (2004) suggest that biotechnology regulation in Europe has 
been captured by the pesticide industry, which has an economic interest in restricting the introduction of 
GM crops, whereas Paarlberg (2001) argues that biotechnology regulation in developing countries has 
been captured by environmental groups rather than by biotechnology firms. Using the case of India, 
Newell (2007a) shows that the biotechnology industry has played a major role in the country’s evolving 
regulatory regime. He finds that biotechnology entrepreneurs from larger multinationals and successful 
start-up firms with good national and global connections were particularly influential. Based on his 
research, he argues against Paarlberg’s view (Newell, 2007b). Good governance in biotechnology 
regulation would obviously imply the need to balance societal interests while avoiding capture by any 








•  Effectively ensuring desired levels of environmental and food safety  
•  Effectively avoiding regulatory failures 
Economic criteria  •  Cost-effectiveness: Achieving desired levels of environmental and food safety at 
lowest possible costs 
•  Optimal “intensity” of regulation: Expected marginal benefits from regulation 
equaling expected marginal costs 
•  Dynamic efficiency: Creating/protecting incentives for innovation 
Good governance 
criteria 
•  Control of special interest capture: Regulation is not captured by special interest 
groups (biotechnology industry, environmental groups) 
•  Fairness: Acceptable balance of different societal interests, and acceptable distribution 
of costs and benefits 
•  Voice and accountability: Processes are transparent and provide scope for citizen 
participation; regulatory agencies are accountable to citizens and their political 
representatives 
•  Control of corruption: Regulation does not create incentives for corruption/has 
safeguards against corruption  
•  Rule of law: Regulations can be enforced 
Conformity criteria  •  Regulation conforms with international agreements (Cartagena Protocol, WTO) 
•  Regulation conforms with regional treaties and national constitutions 
•  Regulation conforms with international good practice standards 
Legitimacy criteria  •  Input legitimacy: Regulatory process is considered fair, transparent, participatory, and 
accountable 
•  Output legitimacy: Performance of regulatory process is considered satisfactory, 
regulatory failures are avoided, and problem-solving capacity is in place 
Source: Authors 
Avoiding special interest capture is related to another aspect of regulatory quality: the capacity of 
the regulatory process to balance the interests, values and risk attitudes of different society groups in such 
a way that the outcome of the process is considered fair. This criterion is linked to the voice and 
accountability criterion. Applying this criterion to the regulation of biotechnology implies that regulatory 
processes should be transparent and provide scope for citizen participation, and that regulatory agencies 
should be accountable to citizens and their political representatives (e.g. parliaments).  
Another good governance criterion is control of corruption in biotechnology regulation. This 
includes avoiding the creation of incentives for corruption and introducing safeguards against corruption. 
Unlike special interest capture, corruption refers to illegal activities. Although little attention has been 
paid to this point thus far in the literature on agricultural biotechnology regulation, it is a real problem. 
For example, in 2005, Monsanto paid a fine of 1.5 Million US$ when it was revealed that one of the 
company’s former senior managers directed an Indonesian consulting firm to give a $50,000 bribe to a 
high-level official in Indonesia’s environment ministry, in an effort to avoid environmental impact studies 




biotechnology regulation may include increased transparency and public participation, as well as 
improved audits and administrative or political oversight. 
Applying the rule of law criterion to biotechnology regulation implies that regulatory decisions 
should be monitored and enforced. Hence, it is important in regulatory decision-making and in the design 
of regulatory systems to determine what aspects can be monitored and enforced, and what capacities 
should be created for this purpose.  
A further set of criteria refers to the conformity of the regulatory system with the international 
obligations that a country has signed, such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, as well as with 
regional treaties, such as WAEMU or ECOWAS. Moreover, the regulatory system needs to conform to 
the constitution of each member country. Conformity with international good practice in biotechnology 
regulation may be considered a criterion, as well.  
A final set of criteria for assessing regulatory design options are those dealing with the creation of 
legitimacy. To a large extent, legitimacy is created by fulfilling the above-described criteria. In the case of 
regional biotechnology regulation in the EU, several authors have distinguished between “input 
legitimacy,” which refers to the regulatory process, and “output legitimacy,” which refers to the 
performance and results of the regulation. The related process criteria, which can be seen as either goals 
in their own right or as pieces instrumental to achieving other goals, include transparency, participation, 
fairness and accountability. Performance criteria, which constitute output legitimacy, include the 
problem-solving capacity of the regulatory system and the avoidance of regulatory failures (Skogstad, 
2002; Wendler, 2005). 
Insights from the Literature  
This section reviews different branches of the economic literature on regulation in order to identify 
factors and trade-offs that policy-makers in West Africa and elsewhere may wish to consider when 
making decisions on the design options outlined in Table 1. The review concentrates on four major 
questions that can be derived from the table: (1) What level should different types of regulatory activities 
be assigned? (2) What level of autonomy/independence should be borne by regulatory institutions? (3) 
What level and form of participation is appropriate? (4) What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different options for financing a regional regulatory system? The environmental and fiscal federalism 
literature discussed in Subsection 3.3.1 concentrates on the first question, while the New Institutional 




Environmental and Fiscal Federalism Literature 
The literature on environmental federalism highlights the nature of the environmental good and the degree 
to which externalities are essential to determining the optimal level of government at which 
environmental regulation should take place (Oates, 2001; 2004). While developed with a focus on local 
versus national governments, the theory can be applied to the national versus supranational level. This 
literature shows that federal and supranational regulation is justified in the case of pure public goods, such 
as greenhouse gas emissions, because the environmental quality in one location is a function of the 
emissions in all other locations. In the case of local public goods without spill-over effects, in contrast, 
local regulation will be justified if one assumes that local governments maximize the welfare of their 
constituents.  
In the case of local public goods with spill-over effects, it is more challenging to identify the 
appropriate level of regulation, since neither national nor local regulation would be efficient (Oates, 
2001). In the absence of transaction costs and distributional concerns, bargaining across local jurisdictions 
would lead to efficient outcomes, according to the so-called Coase Theorem. However, this is obviously 
not a practical solution since transaction costs do matter, as noted by Coase (1960). Still, this theoretical 
consideration shows that in case of spill-over effects, “the efficient outcome will not in general take the 
form of uniform national standards for environmental quality. The efficient pattern of pollution control 
will generally imply different levels of environmental quality across jurisdictions” (Oates, 2001:5). In the 
case of local public goods and local spill-over effects, a common concern is the potential for a “race to the 
bottom” regarding environmental standards. This argument is debated, however, and numerous studies 
have sought to identify the conditions under which a race to the bottom would actually occur (Wellisch, 
2000).  
Applying this line of reasoning to the case of biotechnology, it becomes necessary to distinguish 
different types of technology-associated risks. Some risks, such as escape of unapproved GMOs through 
international trade, are potentially externalities at a global level. However, international escape would 
require the transboundary movement of GMOs, meaning that this risk can be managed by control of 
transboundary trade. The Cartagena Protocol, which six of the eight WAEMU member states have 
ratified, already contains provisions for transboundary movements of GMOs. In case of GM food exports, 
the risk of introducing allergens into the food chain constitutes a potential externality at the global level. 
However, the first-best solution to this problem is to prevent it at the source, before the products reach 
any border.
19 Other potential externalities, such as the creation of an invasive species-type problem, 
                                                      
19 There is also the issue of the potential allergenicity of a product for a small segment of the population. Even groups that 
are critical of labeling requirements for GM food in general agree on the need of labeling requirements for non-substantially 
equivalent GM food products with the potential to provoke allergies. Hence, this case can be considered an international 




would most likely occur at the level of a specific ecological zone, if such an event were to occur.
20 If 
several countries share the same ecological zone and the externality cannot be managed by controlling 
transboundary seed trade, this externality would be a “national spill-over” analogous to the “local spill-
over” in Oates’ theory (see above). Applying the Oates (2001) argument, this problem would not 
necessarily provide an economic rationale for centralized regulation at the regional level, but it would 
suggest the need for regional coordination. Spill-over effects may also occur at the local level in the form 
of gene flow to the fields of farmers who want GM-free crops. This problem can be managed by co-
existence regulations, and has implications for supranational regulation only insofar as may affect farmers 
in border areas.  
The implications for regional regulation change, however, when one considers that countries may 
have only a limited ability to control transboundary movement of GMOs. This may happen, for example, 
if farmers exchange seeds across the border. While some respondents interviewed for the present study 
mentioned this possibility, further data collection would be required to establish the relevance and degree 
of this problem. If the control of transboundary movements of GMOs proves to be problematic, then there 
is stronger justification for the establishment of regional coordination in biotechnology regulation. The 
same reasoning applies if countries want to establish a common market, and thus wish to reduce controls 
on transboundary movements of goods. This is actually the case in the WAEMU and in the ECOWAS 
region. Likewise, the establishment of a common market in the EU has been a strong rationale for the 
delegation of environmental regulation, including biotechnology regulation, to the EU level.  
There is limited evidence available regarding the question of whether a race to the bottom (see 
above) regarding biotechnology regulation may occur across countries within the same region. 
Comparing biotechnology regulation in the EU and the US, Bernauer (2003) analyzes whether political 
subunits within a federal system could push the stringency of system-wide regulation up or down by 
unilaterally installing stricter or laxer regulation of agricultural biotechnology. He concludes that a 
process of “ratcheting up” has taken place in the EU but not in the US. His analysis shows that this 
outcome depends on the degree of centralization and autonomy of the federal regulatory system, and the 
political economy of interest group politics within the system. Oates (2001) finds that federal 
(centralized) environmental regulation in the United States for local public goods with spill-over effects 
has resulted in stronger environmental regulation than would be justified on efficiency grounds.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
labeling is sufficient for such products, or whether they should be avoided altogether. 
20 While such problems may not be likely in the case of Bt cotton, a regional regulatory system should be designed to 
process applications for other crops, as well, including food crops. In a literature review of the world's 13 most important food 
crops, Ellstrand, Prentice & Hancock (1999) show that 12 of these crops hybridize with wild relatives in some part of their 
agricultural distribution. The authors use population genetic theory to predict the evolutionary consequences of gene flow from 
crops to wild plants and discuss two applied consequences of crop-to-wild gene flow: the evolution of aggressive weeds and the 




The fiscal federalism literature, which precedes the environmental federalism literature, provides 
additional insights (see Weingast, 2007 for a review). One factor highlighted in this literature, in addition 
to economies of scale and spill-over, is the role of differences in local preferences, which may provide a 
rationale for decentralization. When applied to the question of regional biotechnology regulation, this 
argument suggests that the transfer of regulatory authority to a supranational body is less justified if there 
are strong national differences in people’s preferences regarding biotechnology. The extent of such 
differences, however, is an empirical question. The farmers’ organizations and civil society organizations 
interviewed for this study revealed differences across the WAEMU countries in terms of positions 
regarding Bt cotton. This may partly be linked to the fact that the political systems in the WAEMU region 
differ in the scope they provide for independent civil society organizations to emerge and formulate their 
positions. Stakeholder information is not necessarily representative of the population as a whole. In the 
future, the inclusion of biotechnology questions into representative surveys, such as the Afrobarometer 
surveys,
21 might provide valuable representative information on public opinions and on the opinions of 
different groups (farmers, consumers) regarding biotechnology.
22 This will only hold true if the 
respondents already have knowledge of biotechnology, so the future inclusion of questions on 
biotechnology might help establish the extent to which people are informed about biotechnology, and 
which sources of information they have used. Both proponents and opponents of biotechnology in West 
Africa have engaged in media campaigns, but it is unclear to what extent information from both sides has 
reached consumers and farmers on a broad scale.
23 
Table 3 summarizes some major insights derived from the environmental and fiscal federalism 
literature, and their implications for biotechnology regulation. The major conclusion is that this literature 
suggests a need for regional coordination, but it does not in itself provide a rationale for centralized 
decision-making on biotechnology regulation. The literature draws attention to the fact that centralized 
decision-making may lead to regulatory standards that are, from an efficiency perspective, either too high 
or too low, especially in the face of national preference differences with regard to the environment and 
technology. This disadvantage must be weighed against the cost of controlling cross-border movement of 
GMOs, which can be reduced through a centralized regulatory system. 
                                                      
21 The Afrobaromenter project conducts comparative series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and 
civil society in Africa. See http://www.afrobarometer.org/. 
22 The Eurobarometer survey may serve as an example. An expert group of researchers from different European countries 
formulates a set of questions on biotechnology that is regularly included into the Eurobarometer survey, thus making it possible 
to track cross-country differences in public perceptions on biotechnology and their changes over time. This survey shows 
considerable cross-country differences in public opinion (Gaskell et al., 2006). The latest round of the Afrobarometer survey 
covered 18 countries, including Benin, Ghana Mali, Nigeria and Senegal in West Africa (Afrobarometer Network, 2006).   
23 If the level of information is low, an opinion survey obviously has little value because the answers may only reflect the 




Table 3. Types of risks and implications for regulatory design  





Implications for regulatory design 
Food safety risks 
(e.g. allergens, 
toxins) 
National and all 
countries to which GM 
food products are 
exported 
Risk attitudes of 
consumers may vary 
across countries 
Need for regulation of transboundary 
movements 
Economies of scale in risk 
assessment for all countries where 
respective food is consumed 
Gene flow to 
other farmers’ 
fields 
Local; may affect border 
areas of neighboring 
countries 
Depend on economic 
interests in GMO-free 
production  
Need for co-existence/distance 
regulations, including border controls 
between countries (segregation and 
identity-preservation production and 
processing methods) 
Gene flow to wild 





Ecosystem; may affect 
neighboring countries if 
they share the same 
ecosystems; may occur 
with or without cross-
border trade 
Risk attitudes of 
farmers and general 
population and 
preferences for 
biodiversity may vary 
across countries 
Need for regulation of transboundary 
movement  
Need for cross-country coordination 
at ecosystem level 
Economies of scale in risk 
assessment at cross-country-level, if 







countries through  which 
GMOs are transported) 
Risk attitudes of 
consumers may vary 
across countries 
Need for regulation of transboundary 
movements 
 
Source: Authors   
New Institutional Economics (NIE) Literature 
The NIE perspective helps identify additional factors that influence the comparative advantage of 
different regulatory design options. According to Williamson’s (1991) “discriminating alignment 
hypothesis,” transactions that differ in their attributes should be aligned with governance structures that 
differ in their costs and competence, so as to effect an economizing result. The term “governance 
structures” refers to the different options for institutional design of a regulatory system. To apply this 
approach to biotechnology regulation, it is necessary to: (1) disaggregate or “unbundle” biotechnology 
regulation into its different regulatory activities or transactions; (2) identify the types of costs associated 
with the different transactions; and (3) identify the attributes and context-specific factors that influence 
the costs arising under different governance structures. These steps are outlined in the following sections.  
Types of Costs and Benefits of Different Regulatory Transactions 
Table 4 specifies the major transactions involved in biotechnology regulation, and lists the types of costs 
and benefits associated with each. When considering more areas of regulation (e.g. property rights, 




reasons of scope, this section discusses only the transactions listed. However, the considerations presented 
in this section can be applied to other regulatory transactions. 
We first look at the choice of governance structure (i.e. the level at which regulation takes place, 
degree of autonomy, role of industry and civil society, etc.). To determine the comparative advantage of 
different governance structures, it is necessary to identify the factors affecting the costs and benefits that 
arise under each one. In the case of regulation, this is mainly a matter of defining which costs should be 
considered “transaction costs” and which should be considered “other” costs. One may consider all 
regulation-related costs to be transaction costs. In the following, we use the term “regulatory costs” for 
the sum of all costs that arise for carrying out a specific regulatory transaction.  
Table 4 also specifies who will incur the different costs; however this does not account for the 
possibility that, depending on the market structure, the industry may be able to pass the costs on to 
farmers, who may be able to pass them on to consumers. In the case of benefits, it is less straightforward 
to determine how they will be distributed, since this depends on both market structure and indirect effects. 
For example, if the regulatory system performs well in terms of risk management, the general public 
benefits directly, but the industry may also benefit indirectly from increased public trust in the 
technology. 
As indicated above, the “optimal intensity” for each regulatory transaction can ideally be 
determined as the level where the marginal social regulatory costs equal the marginal social benefits. 
Prior studies have quantified absolute regulatory costs, for example in India (Pray, Bengali, & 
Ramaswami, 2005). However, little empirical information is available regarding the marginal costs of 
regulation and the absolute and marginal benefits of regulation, which consist of reductions in health, 
environmental and agronomic risks.  
The potential benefits of regulation can be rather high, if one considers the costs that would arise 
following the introduction of an allergen into the food chain, or the creation of an invasive species-type of 
environmental problem or an agronomic resistance problem. One example would be the StarLink
TM case 
in the US, in which GM maize that was only approved for animal feed was found in the human food 
supply. Even though the allergenicity of StarLink
TM was contested, this situation is nevertheless an 
indication of the magnitude of costs that could arise (Talyor & Tick, 2001). Other benefits of regulation 
specified in Table 4, such as creation of legitimacy and trust in regulation, are also rather difficult to 
quantify.  
Acknowledging the challenges of collecting empirical information on the marginal costs and 
benefits of regulation, the following sections use a cost-effectiveness perspective to compare different 
governance structures and derive hypotheses regarding the factors that influence the comparative 




literature of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991), develops hypotheses on the absolute costs 
incurred for performing a regulatory transaction that ensures a defined outcome. If this outcome is not 
achieved under a certain governance structure, the forgone benefits may be considered to comprise an 
additional cost category.  
Table 4. Types of costs and benefits of different regulatory transactions 
Regulatory transaction  Types of costs*  Types of benefits 
Risk assessment for food and 
environmental safety 
I: Costs incurred for conducting 
trials/studies 
A: Costs of assessing dossiers and 
conducting additional tests; costs 
incurred for ensuring compliance with 
field test regulations 
Avoiding health problems and 
environmental/ agronomic problems 




As above  Reducing economic risks for farmers 
Decision-making on approval 
for contained and confined 
trials and for commercial 
release 
A: Costs incurred for negotiations; 
coordination among committees; 
organization of participatory processes 
I: Application fees 
I/C/F: Costs incurred for participating 
in decision-making processes 
F/I: Income forgone in case of approval 
delay 
Avoiding health problems and 
environmental/ agronomic problems 
Building public trust in GM 
technology 
Creating legitimacy for 
biotechnology regulation 
Post-approval monitoring and 
enforcement, e.g. of distance 
(co-existence) regulations and 
refuge guidelines 
F: Costs incurred for compliance 
I: Costs incurred for monitoring
24 
A: Costs incurred for monitoring and 
enforcement 
Avoiding environmental problems 
Avoiding agronomic/ resistance 
problems 
Control of transboundary 
movements of GMOs 
A: Costs incurred for border control 
I: Costs incurred for documentation 
Avoiding environmental/ agronomic 
problems 
Raising revenues for 
regulation 
A/F/I: Costs of raising revenues, e.g. 
administering market levies 
Fair/incentive-compatible 
distribution of regulatory costs  
Source: Authors 
* Costs incurred by A: regulatory agency; I: biotechnology industry and public sector organizations developing GM crops; C: 
civil society organizations/stakeholders; F: farmers. 
Level of Centralization/Decentralization 
Figure 2 illustrates use of the transaction cost approach to determine the optimal level of government at 
which various regulatory transactions should be carried out. The figure shows hypothetical cost curves for 
the regulatory activity under a more decentralized (national) governance structure, x, and a more 
centralized (supranational) governance structure, y. The vertical axis indicates the regulatory costs arising 
                                                      
24 These costs are not necessarily incurred by the biotechnology industry, as they may also be incurred by various actors in 




for the respective transaction, while the horizontal axis displays the attributes, which increase the 
comparative advantage for centralized regulation.
25   
As can be derived from the regulatory federalism literature discussed above, spill-over effects and 
global public good characteristics are important attributes. Economies of scale in performing the 
respective activity are obviously another important attribute. For example, there are potentially large 
economies of scale in centralizing risk assessment for environmental safety in cases where several 
countries share an ecosystem with rather similar ecological conditions. In contrast, there are fewer 
economies of scale in post-approval monitoring activities. The economies of scale in regulatory activities 
are linked to their “transaction intensity” (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004), which reflects the frequency and 
spatial dispersion of transactions. Enforcing refuge requirements, for example, is far more transaction-
intensive compared to decision-making on the approval of field trial or commercial release applications. 
The more important these attributes are—as indicated by a move to the right on the horizontal axis—the 
faster the increase in the hypothetical costs for performing the respective activity under the decentralized 
(national) governance structure, x.  
Figure 2. Comparative efficiency of different governance structures: Level of governance 
Source: Based on Williamson (1991) and Birner & Wittmer (2004) 
                                                      
25 Note that it is not necessary to quantitatively measure the attributes. The approach displayed in Figure 2 is typically used 
to derive hypotheses on the comparative advantage of different governance structures, which can then be tested empirically. See 
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In the case of the centralized (supranational) governance structure, y, the regulatory costs increase 
at a slower pace, which is indicated by a smaller slope of the respective hypothetical cost curve. If the 
respective attributes are not relevant (moving to the left-hand side on the horizontal axis), a decentralized 
(national) governance structure has a comparative advantage over the centralized governance structure. 
From point a1 onwards, a centralized governance structure has a comparative advantage over a 
decentralized governance structure for performing the respective regulatory transaction. In contrast, for a 
< a1, the decentralized governance structure has a comparative advantage.  
Figure 2 also displays the effects of context-specific factors. For example, if the capacity of a 
supranational regulatory agency is increased, it will, ceteris paribus, be able to perform the same 
regulatory activity at lower costs (e.g. because the opportunity costs caused by delays in decision-making 
are reduced). This is indicated by a downward shift of the respective hypothetical cost curve in Figure 2. 
Accordingly, the point at which a centralized organization of the respective transaction begins to have a 
comparative advantage over a decentralized organization moves from a1 to a2. The same effect may occur 
if the respective regulatory activity can be carried out at least partly through an existing supranational 
governance structure, as this reduces the transaction costs required to set up a new supranational system 
for all aspects of regulation. In the case of West Africa, countries can partly rely on the existing 
governance structures of CILSS, WAEMU and ECOWAS for biotechnology regulation, although it will 
be necessary to build subject matter-specific capacity. 
The role of heterogeneous local (or national) conditions and preferences (see above) can also be 
considered as a context-specific factor in Figure 2. In this case, a centralized agency would incur higher 
costs than a decentralized agency, yielding an upward shift of the hypothetical cost curve that indicates 
centralized regulation. Alternatively, a downward shift of the curve may be seen as indicating 
decentralized regulation, relative to the curve indicating centralized regulation. If this representation is 
chosen, the point from which decentralized regulation is more efficient moves to a3. A similar effect 
occurs if knowledge and information on local conditions, rather than scientific knowledge, is required to 
perform a regulatory activity efficiently. For example, local information is important for monitoring 
whether farmers comply with refuge requirements, whereas scientific knowledge is important for 
environmental risk assessment activities. The development of a system for enforcing transboundary 
regulation requires technical and scientific knowledge, but local information is required for actual 
monitoring of transboundary movements (e.g. movement of trucks across borders, etc.).  
Table 5 summarizes the attributes of the different transactions derived from this discussion. The 
table provides a rationale for assigning pre-approval activities (e.g. risk assessment) to a supranational 
level, in order to utilize economies of scale and scarce scientific knowledge. In the case of environmental 




agro-ecological zones. If the agro-ecology is very diverse, however, supranational bodies may be less 
suited for environmental risk assessment responsibilities. The table suggests that there is also a rationale 
for assigning post-approval monitoring and evaluation activities to a national or sub-national level, since 
such transaction-intensive activities are difficult to control from a supranational level. This is less clear-
cut in the case of decision-making activities, such as approval of field trials and commercial release, since 
these steps in the regulatory process tend to be the most politically contested. Therefore, other criteria 
should be considered, such as the creation of legitimacy (see below). 







Type of knowledge/ 
information needed
a 
Food safety risk assessment  low  low  scientific 




Decision on field trial approval low  low scientific 
Decision on commercial release  low  low  scientific 
Monitoring of refuge and co-
existence regulations 
high high  local 
Post-approval monitoring (e.g. for 
gene flow and resistance) 
dependant on ecology 









Enforcement of transboundary 
transport regulation 
high high  local 
Source: Authors 
a “Scientific knowledge” implies that scientists with special knowledge on biotechnology need to be involved. “Local 
knowledge” implies that staff without scientific qualifications in biotechnology can carry out the respective activities, which 
depend more heavily on knowledge of the local conditions. 
b The transaction intensity in terms of spatial dispersion depends on the diversity of the area. It increases with the number of 
agro-ecological zones to be covered.  
c The spatial dispersion and frequency of post-approval monitoring activities depend on the agro-ecology and the goals of the 
monitoring program. For example, the transaction intensity of monitoring for gene flow is higher in areas with frequent cyclones.  
Level of Autonomy  
The transaction cost framework can also be applied to the second aspect of regulatory governance 
structure mentioned above: the degree of independence or autonomy that the regulatory agency has in 
performing a regulatory transaction. As in the case of the level of regulation discussed above, the 
transaction cost framework requires identification of the relevant regulatory transaction attributes.  
The literature on political transaction costs and delegation (Dixit, 1996; Calvert, McCubbins, & 
Weingast, 1989) provides important insights in this regard. This literature suggests that delegation of 




capture,” which arise, for example, if there is a strong trade-off between short-term and long-term 
interests. The creation of independent central banks is a well-known example. In Figure 3, the attribute 
“scope for political interest capture” is displayed on the horizontal axis. From point a1 onwards, an 
independent regulatory agency can perform the respective regulatory transaction at a lower cost than the 
public administration, because in this cost-effectiveness consideration, the benefits of reduced political 
interest capture translate into a lower slope of the respective hypothetical cost curve. For a < a1, however, 
an independent regulatory agency does not have a comparative advantage, because delegation also 
involves costs. These costs have been attributed to “legitimacy drift” and “delegatee drift” (Voigt & 
Salzberger, 2002). Legitimacy drift occurs if the public does not attribute the same legitimacy to the 
independent agency that they would attribute to a governance structure with less delegation. In the case of 
biotechnology regulation, which is politically contested, the question of legitimacy is rather important. 
Delegatee drift occurs if the independent agency pursues goals other than those that the policy-makers 
had in mind when they created the agency. Delegation may also lead to increased coordination costs and 
reduced possibilities for monitoring. 
Figure 3. Comparative efficiency of different governance structures: Degree of autonomy 
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With regard to delegatee drift, it is necessary to consider whether an independent agency or the 
executive/public administration is likely to be subject to interest group capture, either by the industry or 
by environmental groups. In both cases, increased transparency and accountability can reduce the scope 
of this problem, resulting in a downward shift of the respective cost curve. In Figure 3, this option is 
indicated for the case of the public administration, but it would apply equally for an independent agency. 
It is an empirical question as to whether improved transparency and accountability can be established 
more easily in the respective public administration versus an independent regulatory agency, and the 
answer to this question may depend on the level at which the regulatory activity is performed (i.e. 
national or regional). 
An important issue related to the independence of the regulatory agency is its influence on the 
duration of the regulatory decision-making processes. Delegating decision-making authority to the public 
administration or to an independent regulatory agency may have the advantage of reducing the time 
required for decision-making by reducing the scope for politically motivated “blockages,” which may 
occur especially if a consensus rule is applied. However, the concepts of legitimacy drift and delegatee 
drift draw attention to the trade-offs involved in using delegation to deal with this problem. An alternative 
strategy is the specification of time periods for each step of the regulatory process, as seen in the EU 
regulatory system. The EU regulation delegates the authority to approve applications to the Commission 
(i.e. the public administration) if the Council of Ministers (i.e. the political body) fails to act on them 
within three months (Christoforou, 2004). In practice, virtually all approval decisions since the end of the 
de facto moratorium in 2004 have been made by the Commission, since no qualified majority has been 
reached in the Council. 
Role of Participation in Decision-Making 
In addition to the questions of centralization and autonomy, the role that the private sector and civil 
society should play in biotechnology regulation is an important dimension of regional regulatory design 
(Table 1). The question of stakeholder and public participation is particularly relevant for decision-
making, but the public may also be involved in other regulatory activities, such as post-approval 
monitoring.  
Participation in regulatory decision-making can be considered as both a goal in its own right and 
an instrument for reaching other goals, such as reducing conflicts by creating legitimacy. Regulatory 
systems differ considerably with regard to the role of participation, as this question is linked to the wider 
“regulatory culture” developed within a given country. If participation is seen from an instrumental 
perspective, transaction cost economics can be used to analyze the trade-off between increased transaction 




transaction costs of participation include the resources needed to organize participatory processes, the 
opportunity costs of the participants’ time, and the opportunity costs that are incurred if the time required 
to pass regulatory decisions is increased through participation, meaning that the technology becomes 
available later than it would have otherwise. However, participation may also speed decision-making by 
creating legitimacy and providing a formal forum for interaction. Other benefits of participation may 
include reduced enforcement costs due to the creation of legitimacy (cf. Birner & Wittmer, 2004; Mburu 
& Birner, 2002).  
Identifying appropriate decision-making structures in view of conflicting values and interests has 
been a central topic in the public choice literature. As shown by Arrow (1950), there is no procedure that 
makes it possible to aggregate individual interests into a social welfare function (assuming some basic 
principles are met, such as the absence of a dictator). Buchanan & Tullock (1962) developed a classical 
approach for solving this problem that is consistent with the framework suggested here. The authors 
distinguish between the costs of decision-making and “external costs,” the latter of which arise if 
collective decisions negatively affect the interests of the individual. According to Buchanan & Tullock, 
these external costs can be avoided by use of the unanimity rule in decision-making, which implies that 
all individuals must participate in decision-making and consent to the decision. However, as this rule 
increases the costs of decision-making, the decision rule that is optimal from the individual’s point of 
view depends on the trade-off between the costs of decision-making and the external costs for the 
decision under consideration.  
A considerable body of constitutional economics literature deals with the efficiency of different 
collective choice rules based on this approach (Mueller, 2003). This literature could inform the design of 
decision rules to be adopted in regional biotechnology regulation. For example, if the number of countries 
is small, as in case of WAEMU, a consensus rule might be most appropriate for important decisions, such 
as approval of field trials and commercial releases. However, while consensus rule increases the 
legitimacy of decisions, it does entail the problem that one or more member countries may block a given 
decision.  
The transfer of decision-making on biotechnology regulation to a regional regulatory body has 
important implications for the possibilities of participation. On one hand, transaction costs arising from 
participation in decision-making may be reduced if regulatory decisions are made by a supranational body 
and participation takes place at that level, resulting in the need to organize a lower number of 
participatory processes. On the other hand, the possibilities to create legitimacy by participation at that 
level are more limited. Stakeholder organizations would need to be organized at the level where decision-
making takes place, and they would need to have mechanisms making them accountable to their 




WAEMU level through the umbrella organization, ROPPA (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de 
Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, Network of Peasant Organizations and Agricultural 
Producers of West Africa). Consumer and industry organizations do not have a formal umbrella 
organization at the WAEMU level, but the interviews conducted in this study revealed that the 
organizations do collaborate at the regional level. Despite the options created by such regional 
organizations of stakeholders, however, it is unclear to which extent their participation in a regional 
system may create legitimacy at the national level in the absence of national-level participatory processes. 
If participation is seen as a goal in its own right rather than just as an instrument for use in 
reaching other goals, it is useful to combine the efficiency considerations of the NIE and public choice 
literatures with other approaches. The concept of “volitional pragmatism” developed by Bromley (2006) 
on the basis of classical institutional economics offers important insights. This concept, which 
corresponds to the “deliberative” approach to regulatory philosophy, holds that public policy decisions 
should be based on the reasons that citizens can accept as a basis for political action. Scientific findings 
provide an important basis for making such decisions, but according to the volitional pragmatism 
perspective, the public must have the opportunity to judge scientific assertions in terms of reasons that 
matter to them. As Bromley (2006: 165) puts it, “in democratic market economies, citizens retain the 
authority to decide if and when scientific assertions constitute valuable belief.”
26 Along similar lines, the 
concept of deliberative democracy suggests that the deliberations that take place in participatory 
processes can play an important role in creating agreement on the reasons that people can accept for 
public decisions (Fung & Wright, 2001).  
According to these perspectives, it is important to establish forms of public participation that 
allow for meaningful deliberation. Whether and in what form such participation can be achieved at the 
regional versus national level is ultimately an empirical question. A minimum level of citizen 
identification with a regional community would likely be required to achieve this goal. This makes it 
important to determine the extent to which people in West Africa consider themselves to be members of a 
West African community, represented by ECOWAS or WAEMU. Most likely, countries that share the 
same official language and have experienced similar recent histories will have a stronger sense of regional 
identity. Future inclusion of questions on regional identification into a survey conducted in the region 
may provide important information on this matter. 
This question of participation is also linked to the need to identify a desirable balance between 
using the institutions of representative democracy, especially parliaments, to provide voice and 
                                                      
26 This perspective may be criticized by those who argue that regulation should be based on strictly scientific principles. 
This argument ignores the fact that it is a societal decision to transfer decision-making authorities to bodies that are supposed to 
consider strictly scientific principles. Obviously, the degree to which societies are willing to make this decision depends on the 
trust that the public has in scientific regulation. Opinion polls show that this trust differs considerably across countries. It is, for 




accountability versus using participatory approaches that may be classified as deliberative or direct 
democracy. In processes of regional integration, the development of a representative democratic 
institution (i.e. regional parliament) often lags behind the process of economic integration, leaving a 
“democratic deficit.” This problem has been widely discussed with regard to the EU, where the powers of 
European Parliament evolved rather slowly. WAEMU and ECOWAS face similar challenges. As 
indicated above, the European Parliament has the right to be informed on regulatory decisions regarding 
biotechnology. Since WAEMU has an Interparliamentary Committee and ECOWAS has a regional 
parliament, regional regulatory designs should consider the role that these institutions could play in the 
regulatory process. 
Financing Regulatory Systems 
The literature on regulation provides some guidance on the question of how regulatory systems should 
best be financed. Crespi and Marette (2001) and Marette and Crespi (2005) compare the economic 
benefits of different mechanisms for financing regulatory authorities, including public revenue, industry 
fees, and penalties. They show that the level of competition in the respective industry, the expected 
compliance of firms with quality standards, and the monitoring costs all have important effects on the 
comparative advantage of different financing mechanisms. The fiscal federalism literature suggests that, 
in principle, revenues should be raised at the level of government where the respective services are 
provided, but provisions should be made to avoid regional imbalances (Wellisch, 2000). The NIE 
literature suggests that it is necessary to account for the transaction costs involved in different types of 
regulatory system financing, as well as the created incentives (e.g. for opportunistic behavior). Table 6 
presents some general relevant considerations; future work is warranted to substantiate these 
considerations. The different financing mechanisms are displayed separately in the table, but may in 
practice be combined to balance potential negative effects.  
If application fees are used as a financing method, the regulation costs are thereby incurred by the 
companies or research organizations developing the GMOs. If the regulatory system relies entirely on 
application fees, the fees might become high and create disincentives, especially for small companies and 
for public sector organizations. Companies may pass these costs on to farmers through seed pricing, 
though this possibility depends on the structure of the seed industry. In the West African cotton case, the 
seed supply is in the hands of a few vertically integrated cotton companies. Thus, even though the farmers 
are comparatively well organized and play a role in the political process (USDA, 2006), their bargaining 
power is limited and it would be fairly easy for the companies to pass on the regulatory costs to the 




The extent to which farmers can pass on additional costs to consumers also depends on the 
market structure. Farmers are typically price takers, and small countries are price takers in international 
markets, such as cotton. Hence, there are only limited opportunities for farmers to pass the costs on to 
consumers. Accordingly, the benefits that farmers receive from growing GM crops would need to be 
sufficient to cover the incurred costs of their regulation. One advantage of using application fees, 
however, is that the transaction costs of administering application fees are low compared to other options. 
For the WAEMU regional biosafety project, a market levy has been discussed as a mechanism for 
financing the regional regulatory system. If a general market levy is used, all farmers, including those not 
growing GM crops, will incur the costs of regulation. Farmers who do not want to grow GM crops may 
not consider this to be a fair distribution of regulatory costs. If the levy is charged only for GM crops, 
however, the transaction costs of administering the levy are increased. The transaction costs of 
administering a market levy also depend on the market structure. In the case of cotton and other export 
crops it is feasible to charge a market levy, whereas in the case of crops that are marketed locally, such as 
food crops, a market levy would involve rather high transaction costs. Linacre (2007) conducted a 
simulation analysis of financing the proposed WAEMU regional regulatory system through a market levy. 
The analysis showed that problems of financial sustainability could arise if adoption rates are low and the 
system relies only on a market levy collected for Bt cotton. If the collection of revenues through the levy 
is not sufficient to finance the system after the expected donor support ends, this financing mechanism 
may create incentives to approve commercial releases without due process, in order to bridge the financial 
gap. 
A regional regulatory system may also be financed or co-financed from the revenues of the 
regional economic organization under which it is established. Both WAEMU and ECOWAS raise 
regional revenues by taxing imports from non-member states. If these revenues are used to finance the 
regulatory systems, the costs are incurred by the producers and consumers of the imported goods, which 
may not be considered optimal. Moreover, the use of these funds for regulation competes with other fund 
uses. A regional system could also be financed by contributions from the member states; in this case the 
cost distribution depends on the ways in which the member states raise their public revenues, and on 
competing uses for the these revenues. A formula would need to be developed to decide on the shares that 
the member states should contribute. The benefit derived by a member state from growing a given GM 
crop might be used as the basis for such a formula. Financing a regional regulatory system through 
regional revenues or contributions from member states does not create any obvious disincentives for 
innovation, and the transaction costs of using these two mechanisms will be comparatively low if regional 
organizations already have systems in place to collect regional revenues and contributions from member 




Table 6. Implications of different ways to finance a regional regulatory system 
Financial 
mechanism* 
Distributional implications  Implications for incentives  Transaction costs of 




Costs initially incurred by 
applicant; in case of industry 
applicants, costs maybe passed 
on to farmers and then to 
consumers, depending on 
market structure 
Disincentives for innovation, 
especially for small 
enterprises and public sector 
research organizations 
Comparatively low 
Market levy  Costs incurred by all farmers or 
farmers growing GM crops, 
depending on the system used; 
costs maybe passed on to 
consumers, depending on 
market structure 
If levy applies only to GM 
crops, problems of financial 
sustainability may arise, 
depending on adoption rates; 
system may create incentives 
to approve commercial 
release without due process to 
bridge financial gaps 
Need for administration of the 
market levy; costs depend on 
market structure and are 
potentially high, if marketing 
system is diverse/fragmented 





Depends on the way in which 
regional revenues are raised 
(e.g. imports); competition with 
other uses of regional funds 
No obvious disincentives  Comparatively low, if regional 
system of revenue collection is 




Costs incurred by tax payers of 
member countries; cross-
country distribution depends on 
formula used; competition with 
other uses  
No obvious disincentives   Comparatively low, if system 
of national contributions to 
regional organization is 
already in place 
Donor 
funding 
Costs incurred by tax payers in 
donor countries; competition 
with other uses 
Problems of financial 
sustainability may arise if 
funding is not guaranteed 
Depends on the extent to 
which donors set up own 
financial procedures  
Source: Authors 
* Different financial mechanisms may be combined. 
Donor funding can be considered another financial mechanism. To date, donors have invested 
considerably in the establishment of regional regulatory systems in West Africa, and further funding is 
expected. With respect to financial sustainability, donor funds might best be used to cover the fixed costs 
of establishing a regulatory system. If they are used to cover running costs, it is important to establish 
mechanisms that will cover these costs once the donor funding ends. 
The distribution of regulatory costs is also influenced by the distribution of responsibilities for 
risk assessment and risk management between the biotechnology industry and the regulatory agencies. If 
the biotechnology industry takes a major responsibility for risk assessment and risk management, the 
costs incurred by the regulatory agency will be reduced. In most existing regulatory systems, it is the 
responsibility of the applicant to conduct risk assessments, which are then reviewed as part of the 
regulatory process. However, the interviews held in West Africa indicated that public sector 




management. This position may be justified, especially if liability rules or their enforcement possibilities 
are weak, thus limiting industry incentives for risk assessment and management in countries/regions 
where liability rules are strong and enforceable. 
Rules for the Transition to a Regional System 
As noted in Table 1, it is necessary to establish rules for the transition to a regional system. Of particular 
interest is whether or not authorizations for field trials or commercial releases established in a member 
state before it entered a regional system should remain valid after entry. In the case of the EU, prior 
authorizations become invalid. For example, when Romania joined the EU, it had to withdraw the 
approval for Round-up Ready Soy, which was already in cultivation (Gullickson, 2006). A 
“grandfathering rule” can be used to avoid such situations. This is a relevant issue in West Africa, since 
Burkina Faso has already authorized field trials with Bt cotton.   
When deciding on a grandfathering rule, it is important to consider the incentives created by such 
a rule. If the regulatory system at the regional level has stricter standards than the national system, a 
grandfathering rule may create incentives for a country to push through approvals at the national level 
before entering the regional system. If the regulatory standards at the national and regional level are 
comparable, this problem is less relevant. However, other factors should also be considered. If joining a 
regional system is associated with the free movement of GMOs in the respective region, an environmental 




4.  REGIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION– WHICH WAY IS FORWARD? 
This paper has shown that countries interested in a regional approach to biotechnology regulation must 
make decisions on a range of institutional design options (Table 1). The analysis shows that the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of different institutional options depend on an array of 
economic, ecological and social factors. Table 7 summarizes the issues that should be considered in each 
area. 
Table 7. Factors to be considered in decisions on regulatory design options 
Decision points   Factors to be Considered  
1) Scope of the regional system 
Substantive areas and types of 
regulatory activities to be 
regulated at regional versus 
national level 
Attributes of regulatory transactions 
(1)  Economies of scale in regulation, e.g. those arising because countries 
share the same agro-ecological zones 
(2)  Transaction intensity (frequency, spatial distribution) 
(3)  Type of information/knowledge needed (scientific, local) 
(4)  Level at which externalities and spill-overs occur (international, national, 
local) 
Contextual factors 
(5)  Heterogeneity of preferences regarding GMOs and risks 
(6)  Existing capacity of regulatory agencies at national and regional levels 
and prospects to build this capacity at different levels 
(7)  Homogeneity of existing national regulatory systems 
(8)  Existence of or prospects for a common economic space with easy 
transboundary movements of goods 
2) Institutional structure of the regional system 
Type of institutions to be 
established 
(9)  Possibilities to use existing regional institutions for regulation 
(10) Point (6) above; see also points (11) to (15) 
3) Decision-making at the regional level 
Mode of decision-making; 
degree and form of public 
participation in decision-making 
at different levels; issues 
considered in decision-making 
(11) Existing decision rules and procedures in regional organization; role of 
regional parliament 
(12) Scope for political interest capture and corruption 
(13) Potential for “delegatee drift” and “legitimacy drift” arising in case of 
delegation (autonomy of regulatory agency) 
(14) Degree of organization of stakeholders 
(15) Existing forms and traditions of public participation 
4) Financing of a regional system  
Mode of financing the system  (16) Existing financing mechanisms of regional organization 
(17) Structure (incl. level of competition) of the biotechnology industry and 
the seed industry 
(18) Expected compliance of firms with quality standards and monitoring 
costs 
(19) Transaction costs involved in different finance mechanisms (e.g. costs of 
administering a levy) 





Table 7. Continued 
Decision points   Factors to be Considered  
5) Distribution of responsibilities between regulatory agency and industry 
Distribution of responsibilities  (21) Comparative capacity of state agency versus industry in generating data 
needed for regulation 
(22) Incentives of state agency versus industry to provide appropriate data 
Decision points   Factors to be Considered  
6) Enforcement of a regional system 
Institutions and procedures used 
for enforcing regional decisions 
at the country level   
(23)  Legal and political possibilities to use existing regional institutions of 
enforcement 
(24) Points (5) and (7) above  
7) Transition to regional system 
Mode of dealing with existing 
national regulations 
(25)  Differences in standards between national and regional systems, and 
resulting incentives created by different transition rules 
(26)  Degree to which member countries have already authorized GMOs 
(27) Point (7) above 
Source: Authors 
Regarding some of these factors, the available information for West Africa is limited. For 
example, in the absence of representative citizen surveys,
27 it is unclear what level of information 
producers and consumers have about agricultural biotechnology, and to what extent biotechnology 
preferences differ among the potential member countries of the regional regulatory system. Likewise, 
there is limited information on the extent to which cross-border movements of GMOs can be controlled 
(and at what costs), and on the nature of possible disruptions such controls could have on a common 
market. With regard to environmental effects, it would be useful if the regional system had the ability to 
handle future applications for different types of crops. Hence, the spatial nature of possible environmental 
risks should be considered during the design of the regional regulatory system, even if such risks are not 
relevant for Bt cotton, which dominates the current debate on regional regulation. If agronomic or 
environmental risks lead to spill-over effects across country borders, the rationale for a regional approach 
to regulation becomes more pronounced than otherwise.  
With regard to the good governance criteria for assessing regulatory systems, there is also a range 
of open questions. Will it be easier to guarantee transparency, to avoid special interest capture, and to 
control for corruption at the national or at the regional level? Can meaningful public participation and 
deliberation be achieved at the regional level? Under what conditions will regulatory decisions at the 
regional level be considered legitimate? How much trust does the public have in regional organizations? 
Will a consensus rule for decision-making at the regional level, which may enhance legitimacy, lead to a 
blockage of regulatory decisions? Is involving regional parliamentary bodies an appropriate way to 
increase voice and accountability, or are other forms of participation more effective? With regard to the 
                                                      




financing of a regional system, there are open questions and trade-offs as well, such as determining which 
distribution of regulatory costs will be considered fair, while at the same time creating incentives for 
innovation.   
The theoretical considerations presented in this paper can inform the debate on these questions. 
Additional empirical research, for example on the spatial dimension of possible risks, and on public 
perceptions, will further improve the basis for decision-making on regional regulatory design. To a large 
extent, however, the knowledge of local experts, stakeholders and policy-makers will be key to answering 
these questions. The organizations that have promoted the establishment of a regional regulatory system 
in West Africa have all placed strong emphasis on participation, mostly by organizing workshops with 
stakeholders. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that it would be useful to bring the knowledge 
of regional experts, stakeholders and policy-makers to bear—in a structured way—on the specific 
questions of regional regulatory design identified herein. Our analysis also shows that there is merit in 
paying attention to the details of a regional regulatory system by unbundling regulation into different 
activities and reflecting on the appropriate level of organization for each regulatory activity.  
Involving stakeholders in these debates may require forms of interaction other than those 
typically practiced at stakeholder workshops (presentations followed by general discussions). A wide 
range of participatory techniques have been developed in the context of technology impact assessments, 
and these could be applied during the establishment of regional regulatory systems. Combining 
participation with multi-criteria analysis appears to be a particularly promising approach, because 
regional regulatory systems should be evaluated against multiple criteria (Table 2), and stakeholders may 
assign different weights to different criteria. Prior use of multi-criteria analysis in participatory processes 
has shown that this strategy often helps rationalize emotional debates, and may narrow down the number 
of options on which different groups disagree (Rauschmayer & Wittmer, 2006).  
Ultimately, the process of establishing a regional regulatory system is a political process. The 
way in which decision-making will be organized at the regional level, and the way in which the expected 
costs and benefits of a regional system are distributed, have important implications for the political 
economy of establishing such a system. Different interest groups may promote or oppose the process, 
depending on how they envision the regional system working. In the West African case, the interviewed 
groups that were critical of biotechnology were also critical of the establishment of a regional regulatory 
system, as they were concerned that such a regional system could be used to “impose” GM crops on 
countries where resistance against biotechnology is strong. Groups that were in favor of biotechnology 
were generally also in favor of establishing a regional regulatory system, highlighting potential efficiency 
gains. Since political disagreement about biotechnology has led to delays in establishing national systems 




establishing a regional regulatory system will speed up or further slow down the creation of a legal basis 
for the introduction of biotechnology in the region. Likewise, the design of the system and the political 
economy factors influencing its operation will help determine whether regional regulation will ultimately 
lead to a more or a less precautionary approach towards biotechnology in the region. An analysis of the 
political economy of biotechnology regulation in West Africa was beyond the scope of this paper, but this 
is certainly an important field of research relevant to the establishment of regional regulatory systems. 
While West Africa and the EU have been used as empirical cases in this paper, the analytical 
framework presented in Section 3 is equally relevant for other regions of the world that are engaged in 
establishing a regional regulatory system for biotechnology. A dialogue and the sharing of experience 
among experts and stakeholders from different regions might provide further fruitful insights on regional 
regulatory design. Hopefully, this paper can contribute to such dialogues and thus help citizens in 





APPENDIX: INTERVIEWEE AFFILIATION 
Individuals from the following organizations were interviewed during the course of this research: 
 
Benin 
•  National Biosafety Committee 
•  Ministry of Science and Research 
•  Ministry of Agriculture 
•  Ministry of Environment 
•  University d’Abomey-Calavi 
•  National Agricultural Research Institute 
•  JINUKUN/COPAGEN (NGO) 
•  Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) 
•  C/SFEND 
•  ENAM 
•  National Center for Intellectual Property  
 
Burkina Faso 
•  National Biosafety Agency 
•  Ministry of Environment 
•  Ministry of Science and Research 
•  Ministry of Agriculture 
•  Confederation of Burkinabe 
•  National Union of Cotton Producers of Burkina Faso 
•  Network of Peasant Organizations and Agricultural Producers of West Africa 
•  CVeille OGM 
•  National Agricultural Research Institute 
•  DTA (Food Safety) 
•  Lawyers 
•  WAEMU 
 
Mali 
•  USAID 
•  West and Central Africa World Agroforestry Centre 
•  National Biosafety Committee 
•  Ministry of Science and Research 
•  Ministry of Agriculture 
•  Ministry of Environment 
•  ANSSA (Food Safety) 
•  National Assembly  
•  Journalists 
•  CNOP 
•  Campaign for the Development of Textiles. 
•  Consumers Association 
•  Journalists 






•  ENDA-SYPRO (NGO) 
•  University of Gaston Berger 
•  National Biosafety Committee 
•  Ministry of Science and Research 
•  Ministry of Agriculture 
•  Ministry of Environment 
•  Plant and Pesticides (PCP) 
•  University of Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) 
•  National Farmers Organization 
•  National Science academy 
•  CONGAD (NGO) 
•  Journalists 
•  Lawyers 
 
Togo 
•  University of Lome 
•  National Biosafety Committee 
•  Ministry of Science and Research 
•  Ministry of Agriculture 
•  Ministry of Environment 
•  Friends of the Earth Togo 
•  COPAGEN/INADES (NGO) 
•  INADES (NGO) 
•  Journalists 
•  Lawyers 
 
Guinea Bissau 
•  National Agricultural Research Institute INPA 
 
Niger 
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